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Goldie v. Bauchet Properties-California Uniform
Commercial Code: Division Nine's
Application to Ownership Interests In Trade
Fixtures Acquired Under a Real Property Lease
In California, security interests in personal property and fixtures
are comprehensively regulated by Division Nine of the California
Uniform Commercial Code (Code).' Whenever a contest arises
between the holders of conflicting security interests in the same
personal property or fixtures, with certain enumerated exceptions,
2
Division Nine of the Code specifically prescribes the law by which
such disputes are to be governedY In keeping with its original
scope, Division Nine does not apply "[t] o the creation or transfer
of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents
thereunder."4
Recently, in Goldie v. Bauchet Properties,5 the Supreme Court
of California held that Division Nine of the Code does not apply to
conflicts arising between one with a security interest in trade fix-
tures and another with an ownership interest in the same trade
fixtures derived from an interest as owner and lessor in the real
property to which the trade fixtures are affixed. Such disputes are
to be governed by the California law relating to real property and
fixtures.6 Since Division Nine's application has always been lim-
ited to security interests in personal property and fixtures, the
court's holding is not surprising. However, the means by which
the court reached its decision is of interest.
When presented with an alleged "interest in or lien on real
estate" a court would be expected to utilize section 9104(j) of the
Code in denying application of Division Nine to the conflict before
it.7 Yet, in Goldie, where the court was presented with such an
1. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9101 et seq. (West 1964).
2. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9104 (West 1964).
3. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9102 et seq. (West (1964).
4. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9104(j) (West 1964).
5. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161 (197,5).
6. Id. at 317-18, 540 P.2d at 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
7. Section 9104(j) is the general exclusion section of Division Nine with
respect to interests in real estate, including leases. CAL. COMM. CODE §
9104(j) (West 1964).
interest, not only did the court fail to utilize 9104(j), but it indi-
rectly held the section to be inapplicable." The court refrained from
using 9104(j) of the Code although no alternative sections were
directly on point. It was only after an extended analysis of the
term "fixtures", resulting in an interpretation of the term "fixtures"
in 9102(1)c to mean both "fixtures" and "trade fixtures", that the
court was able to utilize 9102(1)c of the Code in denying applica-
tion of Division Nine to the conflict before it.9
Since the application of either section 9104(j) or 9102(1)c leads
to the same result (the denial of Division Nine's application to the
conflict), and since the court in Goldie could have applied 9104(j)
without having engaged in an extended analysis of the term "fix-
tures",10 it is not directly apparent why the court used 9102(1)c
rather thna 9104(j). The failure of the court to explain its decision
not to utilize 9104(j) of the Code is likely to generate confusion as
to that section's proper function. In order to appreciate the con-
fusion which is likely to arise, a detailed presentation of the case
is necessary.
Through two corporations of which he was the sole shareholder,
Henry Kermin operated a frozen food business on real property
which he owned. In November of 1966, Kermin sold the real
property to a group of individuals (the defendants, Bauchet Prop-
erties) which immediately leased it to the Kermin corporations for
twenty years. The lease was not recorded.
At the time of the sale and lease of the real property, one of the
Kermin corporations owned an automatic packaging machine which
it was using in the frozen food business. This machine was bolted
to the cement floor, but could be removed without injury to the
8. The court did not specifically mention § 9104(j). Rather, it stated:
"Section 9102 subdivision (1), provides in pertinent part that with excep-
tions not here applicable division 9 'applies .... ." 15 Cal. 3d 307, 315, 540
P.2d 1, 7, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1975) (emphasis added). Section 9104(j)
is one of those exceptions which without explanation the court held was
"not here applicable".
Though there is no legal precedent which would directly compel the ap-
plication of § 9104(j) to the facts in Goldie, neither is there precedent for
declaring the section inapplicable. As the discussion to follow will demon-
strate, the application of § 9104(j) would have enabled the court in Goldie
both to avoid its strained analysis of § 9102(1)c and to issue a more com-
prehensive holding.
9. Id. at 314-18, 540 P.2d at 6-9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166-69.
10. Section 9104(j) applies when an interest in or lien on real estate
is present, whereas § 9102(1) c requires, in addition to such an interest, the
presence of a security interest in fixtures. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9102(1)c,
9104(j) (West 1964).
[vOL. 3: 377, 1976] Goldie v. Bauchet Properties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
premises." Article V of the lease granted a security interest in
the packaging machine to the lessor defendants:
[L]essee hereby grants to Lessor a security interest in all its fix-
tures, machinery, equipment, furniture, furnishings, and the pro-
ceeds therefrom presently owned by Lessee and located at said
demised premises .... Upon the default in the performance of
any of the obligations of the Lessee as provided in Article XVIII,
Lessor shall immediately have the remedies of a secured party
under the Uniform Commercial Code.12
Article XII of the same lease further provided:
[T]hat if Lessee be in default, it shall not then have any right
of trading in, replacing or removing of such trade fixtures, equip-
ment, and other like property which it may have installed. 13
In December of 1967 one of the Kermin corporate lessees bor-
rowed $10,000 from plaintiff Malcom Goldie and executed and
delivered to plaintiff its demand promissory note in that amount.
Interest was payable in monthly installments due on the last day
of each month. The Kermin corporate lessees also granted plaintiff
a security interest in the packaging machine through an executed
and delivered security agreement. In Februray of 1968, plaintiff
filed the security agreement on the packaging machine with the
Secretary of State of California.
On September 1, 1969, the Kermin corporate lessees defaulted in
the payment of rent due the defendants under the lease. On Sep-
tember 30, 1969 the lessees defaulted in the interest due plaintiff
under the terms of the demand promissory note. The Kermin cor-
porations surrendered the leased premises, including the packaging
machine, to defendants on October 6, 1969. On November 25, 1969
plaintiff demanded and defendants refused to surrender possession
of the packaging machine. Thereafter, plaintiff instituted an action
against defendants for possession of the packaging machine.
The trial court concluded that the packaging machine was a trade
11. The trial court found and concluded on substantial evidence that the
packaging machine was a trade fixture. The Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court on this issue. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 313, 540 P.2d 1, 6, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 166 (1975); Beebe v. Richards, 115 Cal. App. 2d 589, 591, 252 P.2d
688, 690 (1953); see, Horowitz, Fixtures in California, 26 So. CAL. L. REv.
21, 40-45 (1952).
12. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 311 n.2, 540 P.2d 1, 4 n.2, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 164 n.2
(1975).
13. Id. at 311 n.3, 540 P.2d at 4 n.3, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 164, n.3.
fixture which is the equivalent of personal property in California.14
As personal property, the packaging machine was appropriate for
use as collateral under a security agreement.' Since plaintiff had
perfected his security interest by filing with the Secretary of State,
his interest prevailed over that represented by defendants' unfiled
lease, entitling him to possession of the packaging machine.',
Before the Supreme Court, defendants asserted that the trial
court had committed prejudicial error in basing its decision on the
California Uniform Commercial Code (Code). Defendants claimed
that the conflict between plaintiff and defendants was to be prop-
erly resolved only through application of the law of California
relating to real property and fixtures.
The California Supreme Court held that the nature of defendants'
claim to the packaging machine would determine which law was to
apply.1 7 The court recognized that Article V, supra, of the lease
between defendants and the Kermin corporations granted a security
interest in the packaging machine to defendants.18 However, the
court noted that the wording of Article VII, supra, was reasonably
susceptible of two constructions. Either the loss of the right to
remove the machine upon default was merely a protection of
defendants' security interest, or it was declarative of an ownership
interest in the defendants, separate and distinct from any security
interest already possessed by them.19
The trial court had not ascertained the nature of defendants'
interest, that is, whether it was a security interest or an ownership
interest derived from defendants' interest in the real property as
owners and lessors. Unable to make this determination as a matter
of law, the California Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court to make the necessary finding.
Anticipating either of two findings by the trial court, Justice
Sullivan, speaking for the court, proceeded to set forth the appli-
cable law in the alternative. If defendants possessed but a security
interest, then Division Nine of the Code would be applicable. 20  In
such event, plaintiff's perfected security interest in the personal
property would prevail over defendants' non-perfected security
interest. 21
14. Id. at 312, 540 P.2d at 5, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 165, 3 WTrrKiN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 469, at 2153 (8th ed. 1973).
15. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 312, 540 P.2d 1, 5, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 165 (1975).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 318, 540 P.2d at 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9102, 9304, 9312 (West 1964).
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However, if defendants' interest in the packaging machine was an
ownership interest based on their position as owners and lessors of
the real property, then the California law relating to real property
and fixtures would be applicable. 22  Under this law, "(w)here
trade fixtures removable by the tenant under the terms of a lease
are later encumbered by a chattel mortgage given to a third party,
the 'rights of the chattel mortgagee are derivative.' ",23 "Thus, if
the tenant has lost his right to remove the fixtures, the right of the
chattel mortgagee is similarly affected." 24 'Since plaintiff's security
interest (chattel mortgage) in the packaging machine arose after
formation of the lease between defendants and the Kermin corpora-
tions and after the machine had been affixed to the premises, the
interest was derivative, and plaintiff could assert no greater right
against the lessors than could the lessees.25  When the Kermin
corporations defaulted on the lease, their right to remove the
packaging machine from the leased premises was forfeited. There-
fore, under the California law of real property, defendant lessors
would prevail over plaintiff for possession of the packaging machine,
because plaintiff Goldie was bound to stand in the shoes of the
defaulting lessees. 26
Assuming that the defendants' interest in the packaging machine
was an ownership interest, derived from their interest in the real
property as owners and lessors, it is quite interesting to examine the
manner in which the court determined that the conflict between
defendants and plaintiff was to be governed by the California law
of real property and fixtures.
The entire focus of the court was on section 9102 of the Code.
The pertinent subsections are as follows:
22. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 318, 540 P.2d 1, 9, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169 (1975).
23. Id. at 313, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166; Rinaldi v. Goller,
48 Cal. 2d 276, 281, 309 P.2d 451, 455 (1957).
24. 15 Cal. 3d at 313, 540 P.2d at 6, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 166; Rinaldi v.
Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 281-82, 309 P.2d 451, 455 (1957); Weisberg v. Lough-
ridge, 253 Cal. App. 2d 416, 426 61 Cal. Rptr. 563, 572 (1967); United Pa-
cific Ins. Co. v. Cann, 129 Cal. App. 2d 272, 275-76, 276 P.2d 858, 861 (1954).
25. Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 281, 309 P.2d 451, 455 (1957).
26. A different rule prevails where the tenant installs fixtures which are
owned by a third party. Under these circumstances, a landlord seeking pos-
session of the fixtures pursuant to terms of the lease on default by the ten-
ant must stand in the shoes of the tenant. Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal.
3, 6-7 (1880).
(1) Except as otherwise provided in ... section 9104 on ex-
cluded transactions, this division applies so far as concerns any
personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this
State... (c) To any transaction (regardless of its form) which
is intended to create a security interest in goods which are or
later become 'fixtures' under the law of this State, but as against
third parties having or acquiring an interest in or a lien on the
real property, the rights are governed by the law of this State
relating to real property and fixtures.27
As was noted earlier, the court determined that section 9104(j)
of the Code was inapplicable to the issue before it, although no
reason was given for this determination. Section 9102(1)c, supra,
became the object of an extended analysis by the court. As writ-
ten, 9102(1)c is specifically restricted in application to "goods which
are or later become fixtures." Initially the court indicated that
"'(t)rade fixtures' are goods determined not to be 'fixtures...
and thus cannot come within the purview of section 9102 subdivi-
sion (1), subsection (C)."128
However, the court eventually interpreted the term "fixtures" in
9102(1)c to encompass both fixtures and trade fixtures. This view
was thought to be consonant with the Legislature's clear intent.29
Such an interpretation resulted in the conflicting interests of plain-
tiff and defendants falling clearly within the paramaters of
9102(1)c, thereby mandating an application of the California law
relating to real property and fixtures.30
The reasoning used to support the court's interpretation demands
inspection. In 1963, when California adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, it deleted 9-31331 and added 9102(1)c, supra.32 The
Legislature's clear purpose in so doing was, according to the court
in Goldie, "[TO] immunize from the reach of the California Uniform
Commercial Code the rights of holders of interests not only in real
27. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9102 (West 1964).
28. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 317, 540 P.2d 1, 8, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (1975);
Horowitz, Fixtures in California, 26 So. CAL. L. REV. 21, 40-45 (1952).
29. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 317, 540 P.2d 1, 8, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (1975).
30. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9102(1)c (West 1964).
31. This section governs conflicts arising between those with interests
in fixtures and those with interests in real property. The definition of what
a fixture is, however, was left to be determined by state law. The drafts-
men of the California Code, in support of the deletion of § 9-313, "[CON-
TENDED] that in leaving open the question of what a fixture is while
merely stating the consequences that follow the definition of property as
a fixture, the Code (UCC) misses the point that courts have traditionally
made the decision of what a fixture is in terms of what legal results would
follow from this determination." California Continuing Education of the
Bar, 3 CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAW § 4.66 at 225 (1966).
32. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 315, 540 P.2d 1, 7, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161, 167 (1975).
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property but thereby also in property affixed to it."'3 3 It was this
view of the Legislature's clear purpose which enabled the court in
Goldie to construe the term "fixtures" in 9102(1)c to encompass
both fixtures and trade fixtures.
The court's view of the Legislature's clear purpose appears to be
accurate only if the phrase "property affixed to it", supra, is not
extended beyond the term "fixtures" to encompass trade fixtures.
Section 9-313 of the UCC (1962 version) as well as 9102(1)c of the
Code make specific reference only to fixtures, not to trade fixtures.3 4
Admittedly, both fixtures and trade fixtures are affixed to real
property. However, it is suggested that this similarity alone is
insufficient to support an inference from writings in which only the
term "fixtures" was used that the writings were clearly intended
to apply to both fixtures and trade fixtures. This view is rein-
forced by the fact that in California, trade fixtures, unlike fixtures,
are treated as personal property. 35 The authorities cited by the
court in Goldie do not evidence a contrary view.3 6
Even assuming that the court's final interpretation of 9102(1) c
was consonant with the Legislature's clear intent, this does not
explain the failure of the court to address 9104(j) in the first in-
stance. The words used to describe the real property interests in
9102(1)c ("an interest in or lien on the real property") 37 are
virtually the same as those used in 9104(j) ("an interest in or lien on
real estate").38 Nevertheless, the court dismissed the applicability
of 9104(j) outright, yet proceeded to engage in an extended analysis
before it was able to place the conflict between defendants and
plaintiff within the parameters of 9102(1)c.
Division Nine of the Code regulates security interests in personal
property and fixtures. Asserted interests in real property are to be
33. Id. at 317, 540 P.2d at 8, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
34. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 (1962 version); CAL. COMM. CODE
§ 9102(1)c (West 1964).
35. See, 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Security Interests in
Real Property § 56, at 1663, Real Property § 469, at 2153 (8th ed. 1973).
36. California Continuing Education of the Bar, 3 CALIFORNIA COMMER-
cIAL LAW § 1.9 at 11-12, § 4.66 at 225-26 (1966); Note, 37 CAL. STATE BAR
J. 119, 201 (1962); Report of Professors Marsh and Warren to the Senate
Fact Finding Committee, 1 APPENDIX TO SEN. J. at 577-78 (1961 Reg. Sess.).
37. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9102(1)c (West 1964).
38. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9104(j) (West 1964).
left to the laws relating to real property. It is important to the
efficient operation of the commercial process that those relying
upon Division Nine of the Code be able to clearly ascertain to
which conflicts the Division's rules will apply and to which they
will not. The California Supreme Court's decision in Goldie v.
Bauchet Properties3 9 is likely to generate confusion as to the func-
tion which 9104(j) of the Code is to play in this process.
An example will help demonstrate this view. Assume there exists
a commercial leasing relationship involving real property, with a
provision of the lease stipulating that upon default, the landlord
shall be considered the owner of all the tenant's equipment and
furniture. For purposes of this example, the landlord's interest in
the tenant's equipment shall be considered an ownership interest as
that term was used in Goldie. Assume further that at the time the
lease was signed the tenant had numerous typewriters in use on the
premises. Later, the tenant borrowed money from a bank, giving a
security interest (chattel mortgage) in the typewriters and other
equipment. Thereafter, the tenant defaulted on the lease and then
on the loan. According to Goldie, there is apparently no section of
Division Nine which would relate to this problem. Section 9104 (j),
which appears as if it might apply due to the landlord's ownership
interest in the typewriters derived from his interest in the real
property as owner and lessor, might nevertheless be inapplicable for
the same reason it was inapplicable in Goldie. Yet 9102 (1) c would
certainly be inapplicable because the typewriters in this hypothet-
ical are neither fixtures nor trade fixtures.
It would seem reasonable to infer from the holding in Goldie that
the court took a very narrow view of 9104(j)'s applicability. It is
suggested that an opposite view would be more consistent with the
intended function of that section4 and would lead to a clearer
39. 15 Cal. 3d 307, 540 P.2d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1975).
40. Section 9104(j) has been amended to read: "This division does not
apply . . . (j) to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real
estate, including a lease or rents thereunder and to any interest of a lessor
and lesee in any such lease or rents . . . ." CAL. COMM. CODE § 9104(j)
(West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). The amendment became effective
January 1, 1976. However, the Legislature specifically noted that the
amendment to subdivision (j) of § 9104 "[SHALL] be deemed declaratory
of the meaning of this code as it existed prior to January 1, 1976." CAL.
COMM. CODE § 11108 (West Supp. 1975). Not only does this amendment
give support to a broader view of this section, as advocated by this writer,
but in addition, it suggests that § 9104(j) may have been originally intended
to exclude from the application of Division Nine of the Code all security
interests in personal property created under the terms of a real property
lease. Of course, such a view would be in certain conflict with the holding
in Goldie.
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awareness among those who rely on Division Nine of the nature
and scope of the interests in real estate to which the Division does
not apply.
CHARLES M. MORGAN III
